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The subject of intellectual disability: A reply to Clegg, Murphy and Almack 
Murray K. Simpson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a starting point, Clegg, Murphy and Almack (2017) contend that frameworks of policy fail 
both to engage with ethical theory and to fit with the complex realities of how services are 
delivered. Both of these points are well supported both in their engagement with literature 
and in the research presented. Their Deleuzoguattarian analysis and Deleuzean ethical 
alternatives provide fresh and challenging insights. The key question in this rejoinder is 
whether their critique goes too far, or not far enough. 
 
To begin, however, it is worth making a comment on terminology. Clegg et al begin with a 
passing comment to the effect that ‘intellectual disability’ was ‘formerly learning disability in 
the UK and mental retardation in the US’ (p.5). Whilst this is clearly a gloss on an issue that 
may not be central to the paper, to overlook changes in terminology can miss important 
other conceptual and political shifts. One of the most important aspects of ‘ID’ is that it 
marks a coming together of the academic field for the first time since the beginning of the 
twentieth century. In the UK the highly contested shift to ‘learning difficulties’ in the 1980s, 
and, to a lesser extent, ‘learning disability’, was marked by the fact that it was the first time 
that people to whom that term was applied were active in promoting it. 
 
By uncritically shifting to ID and appearing to assume that it refers to the same thing, the 
opportunity to keep terminology available as a political weapon for those caught in its net is 
unfortunate. Secondly, however, it cannot be regarded as a new signifier for the same 
concept since ‘learning’ is an activity, a practice, whilst ‘intellectual’ returns the signifier to 
what is assumed to be inside either the brain or mind. If the shift in academic terminology 
to ID does take place, and there are certainly good arguments for it, then we ought not to 
take this as unproblematic and neither should we anticipate that there must be a 
corresponding shift at the policy and service level. 
 
The central premise of Clegg et al’s paper is the ‘slippery’ nature of choice for people with ID 
and its general promotion without attention to varying levels of capacity. However, herein 
also lies the key problem of the paper. Choice is regarded as less than straightforward for 
people with ID because of their reduced capacity for making ‘informed’ choices. Central to 
this critique lies the troublesome figure of the liberal subject and the failure of people with 
ID to fit its strictures – by definition, it has been argued (Simpson, 2014). The authors’ 
position here evinces a number of problems. 
 
The first issue arises from a failure fully to follow through the critique of the liberal subject. 
Following Reinders (2000), the authors identify liberalism’s emphasis on autonomous 
human agency as intrinsically problematic for people with ID. People with ID, it is argued, 
lack the necessary capacity for the kind of rational self-determination assumed and required 
in a consumer society, albeit to varying degrees. However, the paper repeatedly invokes 
choice and the assertion that people with ID have an impaired ability to practice it, and, in 
doing so, fails to kill off the modern subject, as Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1987) attempt 
to do. Instead, the modern subject is constantly deployed as the silent standard against 
which people with ID have pathological subjectivity. Hence, the spectre of the liberal subject 
still haunts the paper as the putative norm for those who do have full mental capacity and 
from which deviance is determined. This is evident in the assumption that the ideology of 
choice does bear a close relationship to how choices are generally made, and that choice is 
the fundamental driver in human behaviour – so, for example, the questioning of whether 
certain choices can be regarded as ‘reasonable’ makes implicit recourse to an assumed 
measure of reasonableness. Žižek highlights the condition of the modern subject: 
 
[B]eing compelled to make decisions in a situation which remains opaque is our basic 
condition.  We know the standard situation of the forced choice in which I am free to 
choose on condition that I make the right choice, so that the only thing left for me to 
do is make the empty gesture of pretending to accomplish freely what expert 
knowledge has imposed upon me. (Žižek, 2009, p.63) 
 
Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari leave no ground available for the unified, autonomous 
subject at all (eg 1984). In other words, it is not simply people with ID’s failure to be liberal 
subjects that is the problem, it is the specific challenge that some people pose to the 
ideological myth of sovereign autonomy that leads to them being enmeshed in the 
‘apparatus’ (Agamben, 2009) of ID (Simpson, 2014). Even the historically constituted basis of 
‘intelligence’ or ‘capacity’ (Goodey, 2011) is not acknowledged. 
 
This leads to a second, related, issue, this time relating to the connection between choice 
and identity. Building further on Deleuze and Guattari, Clegg et al assert, ‘focus on choice 
controls the way that identity can be expressed’ (p.7). Notwithstanding the fact escaping 
systems of control is never an option (Deleuze, 1993), the concept of ‘identity’ must be 
historicised. The, apparently contradictory, idea of an individual having ‘identity’, which 
obviously implies ‘sameness’, is early modern. In one of the earliest formulations of the idea 
of individual identity, Locke (1690/1961) defines it as those aspects of subjectivity that are 
consistent for a person over time. Hence: 
 
to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands 
for;—which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking… 
(Locke, 1961, II. xxvii., 9, p. 280) 
 
Therefore, choice, identity and the modern subject are indivisible, making it tautological to 
suggest that choice controls identity. Additionally, ‘identity’, as subject-consistency, is 
radically incompatible with the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. 
 
Thirdly, in the case studies, ‘choice’ becomes a frame that the researchers repeatedly 
impose upon responses. Whilst this may well reflect the presentation of the data, the word 
‘choice’ crops up in only one interview extract, and then it refers to the choice of a parent. 
All other mentions of choice in relation to the interview results appear to be interpretations 
of what was said. ‘Choice’ thus functions as the filter from the data into the analysis – 
defining certain statements as ‘choice’ – as well as providing the analytical framework itself. 
The paper thus finds what it has already placed. 
 
However, given the authors’ objective of introducing Deleuzean ethics, the problematic 
analysis of ‘choice’ and the liberal subject may be inconsequential. In the proposed shift 
away from rule-based ‘morality’, which shapes the capitalist consumer – rational, 
autonomous, self-interested and individual – Clegg et al argue for the adoption of 
‘relational’, ‘practical’ ethics that result in ‘joyful’, ‘affirmative’ living, that ‘reach beyond 
rather than challenge liberal values’ (p.8). However, the detachment from history and 
structure leaves Deleuzean ethics, at least on this account, silent on gender, class, race and 
other lines of oppression, at a structural level. Even though gender, for instance, is a clear 
issue in caring, and threads itself throughout the authors’ data, it is never explicitly 
discussed or theorised other than in the caring relationship. Similarly, the socio-economic 
class of the three families is cited, but not explored as an ethical issue. Paradoxically, the 
proposed Deleuzean approach, reduces ethics purely to a level of how individuals interact. 
There is no apparent interest in or point of leverage for structural, cultural, economic or 
political change. It is on precisely such points that resurgent continental Marxism, e.g. Slavoj 
Žižek (2004) and Alain Badiou (2004), assert their critique of Deleuze, Guattari and others. 
Playing into these critiques, rather than a ‘going beyond’, the authors appear to abandon 
‘rights, distributive justice or the law’ (Braidotti 2012, cited in Clegg et al, 2017, p. 8), which 
are given no positive place in the ethical scheme. So, whilst they identify the principal 
‘defences’ and ‘critiques’ of liberalism, it is not clear whether they have any sympathy for 
either. Certainly, no argument is made for fundamental social change, but, at the same 
time, implicit hostility to liberalism seems to run throughout.  
 
 
Whilst Clegg et al’s paper is undoubtedly important and challenging, the Deleuzoguattarian 
reading of choice and ID does not always go sufficiently far. The authors’ critical emphasis 
seemed placed only on those concepts which they wished to problematize, even though the 
same points needed to be made throughout. It is not only ‘choice’ which is ‘slippery’, the 
very concept of ‘transition’ becomes problematic when subject to a Deleuzean reading. 
‘Transition’ suggests something relatively discrete, a movement or process from A to B. For 
Deleuze, of course, we are always and already in a state of ‘becoming’.  
 
Notwithstanding the centrality of ‘choice’ to the paper, it also remains frustratingly 
untheorised throughout. The fact that it is presented as a relatively straightforward and self-
evident concept or practice, highlights both the dependency of the paper on the silent 
liberal subject and overly simplistic assumptions about how choices are made generally. 
Beyond the implication that choice should be over-ridden for people with profound ID 
where it is in their best interests, a more consistent position is perhaps available. Curiously 
absent from the Deleuzean critique of choice is any discussion of ‘desire’, though it is central 
to Deluzean ethics. There are only three references to ‘desire’ in the paper, none of these 
are particularly Deleuzean sense. As Shildrick (2009) notes: 
 
Desire is not an element of any singular subject; it is not pregiven; it is neither 
possessed nor controlled; it represents nothing; and nor does it flow directly from 
one individual to another. Instead it comes into being through…’desiring machines’, 
assemblages that cannot be said to exist outside of their linkages and 
interconnections, and which may encompass both the animate and inanimate, the 
organic and the inorganic. (Shildrick, 2009, p. 135) 
 
The introduction of desire allows for the liberal concept of ‘choice’ to be taken entirely out 
of the equation for all. Not only do ethics become relational, but all lines of separation, 
domination and categorisations, including ID, become ethically unsustainable. For this 
reason, then, the authors’ ambitions must be judged incomplete. If Deleuzean ethics are 
indeed radical, then a more thoroughgoing approach is needed, if not, the objections of 
critics that they are an ideological cover for neoliberalism must be addressed. 
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